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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This amended brief removes a footnote on page three and clarifies the 
timeliness of Farr's Rule 35 Motion. 
Dwayne Joseph Farr appeals from his judgment of conviction on guilty 
plea to felony domestic battery. Farr argues the district court erred by failing to 
sua sponte order a mental health evaluation before sentencing, and by 
relinquishing retained jurisdiction. Farr also argues the district court abused its 
discretion by not reducing his sentence of eight years with three years fixed. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Dwayne Joseph Farr assaulted his wife Gena Farr by slapping her in the 
face, throwing her against the wall and strangling her, and threatening her with a 
kitchen knife. (PSI, pp. 3-4.) Farr also grabbed Gena by the hair and dragged 
her around the living room as their four year-old son and 15 year-old daughter 
watched. (PSI, p. 4.) Gena escaped with the children and called police. (PSI, p. 
4.) Police found and arrested Farr, who smelled of alcohol and slurred his 
speech. (PSI, p. 4.) 
The state charged Farr with felony domestic battery, felony attempted 
strangulation, and felony aggravated assault. (R., pp. 43-44, 53-55.) The district 
court entered a no contact order against Farr, prohibiting him from having any 
contact with Gena, or being within 300 feet of their shared residence unless 
accompanied by law enforcement. (R., p. 37.) 
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Pursuant to a written agreement, Farr pleaded guilty to the domestic 
battery charge. (R., pp. 49-52.) In exchange, the state dismissed the remaining 
counts and agreed to recommend probation and local jail time at sentencing, so 
long as Farr complied with terms in the settlement offer. (R., pp. 52, 56-60.) At 
the plea hearing, the district court advised Farr he would be released on his own 
recognizance subject to conditions which included compliance with the no 
contact order. (12/21/11 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 22-24; p. 14, L. 18-p. 15, L. 23.) In the 
weeks before his sentencing hearing, Farr violated the no contact order twice. 
(R., p. 64; PSI, pp. 8, 34; 2/17/12 Tr., pp. 5, 7.) Thus at sentencing, the district 
court imposed a term of eight years with three years fixed, but retained 
jurisdiction and recommended placement in the therapeutic community. (2/17 /12 
Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-9; R., pp. 66-70.) 
At Farr's jurisdictional review hearing in October 2012, the state argued 
that Farr violated terms and conditions of his rider program. (10/5/12 Tr., p. 42, 
Ls. 15-19; see PSI, p. 54.) At the hearing, Gena testified that Farr called her 
phone number "almost every day, several times a day" while in his retained 
jurisdiction program. (10/5/12 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 13-14; p. 29, Ls. 9-18.) Disciplinary 
hearing officer Tom Rodgers testified that Farr acknowledged making phone 
calls to Gena's phone, but said he had a right to contact his daughter. (10/5/12 
Tr., p. 39, L. 20- p. 40, L. 10; p. 40, Ls. 13-14.) 
The district court noted that Farr was served with a no contact order 
prohibiting him from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with Gena. 
(10/5/12 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 8-13.) The court said it did not believe "that because he's 
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allowed to contact his children that gives him the right to contact his children 
through his wife's phone number, knowing that there is a no contact order in 
place." (10/5/12 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 17-20.) Accordingly, the court found the no 
contact order violation was substantiated. (10/5/12 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 1-4.) In light of 
the troubling, "[i]n fact ... chilling" facts, the court relinquished jurisdiction and 
executed Farr's sentence of eight years with three years fixed. (10/5/12 Tr., p. 
46, Ls. 9-19.) 
Farr filed a timely notice of appeal. 1 (R., pp. 94-96.) Later, Farr filed a 
timely motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35, which the district court denied. 
(2/8/13 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-14; p. 12, Ls. 8-18; 3/26/13 Order Granting 
Augmentation.) 
1 Under Idaho Criminal Rule 14(a), timely appeal from an order relinquishing 
jurisdiction gives the appellate court jurisdiction to review the district court's 
sentence imposed. State v. Hansen, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 1859337 (Idaho App. 
2013) (citation omitted). 
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ISSUES 
Farr states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court act in manifest disregard for the 
pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. 
§ 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte order a mental 
health evaluation of Mr. Farr prior to sentencing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished 
its retained jurisdiction over Mr. Farr? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Farr's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Farr failed to demonstrate the district court erred in not sua sponte 
ordering a mental health evaluation of Farr before sentencing? 
2. Has Farr failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction? 
3. Has Farr failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his Rule 35 motion? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Farr Has Failed To Demonstrate The District Court Erred In Not Sua Sponte 
Ordering A Mental Health Evaluation Of Farr Before Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Farr asserts he "suffers from serious mental health problems" that 
warranted evaluation before sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) According to 
Farr, the district court's failure to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation 
was in manifest disregard of Idaho law. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-13.) Farr has 
failed to show fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court will affirm the district court's decision not to order a 
psychological evaluation if the record supports "that there was no reason to 
believe [the] defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at 
sentencing or if the information already before the court adequately meets the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3)." State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 409, 162 
P.3d 787, 788 (Ct. App. 2007). Where, as here, the defendant did not request a 
psychological evaluation or object to its absence at sentencing, the defendant 
must show the sentencing court's failure to order an evaluation was fundamental 
error in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32. State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 
820,229 P.3d 1179, 1182 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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C. The Record Supports The District Court's Decision Not To Order A 
Psychological Evaluation 
Although a presentence investigator may recommend a psychological 
evaluation, the decision to order the evaluation "lies within the sentencing court's 
discretion." I.C.R. 32(d); Collins, 144 Idaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. Thus, the 
sentencing court is not required to order an evaluation on the presentence 
investigator's recommendation alone. By statute, the court shall order an 
examination of defendant's mental condition if there is reason to believe such 
condition "will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown." 
I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). A defendant's mental condition presents a significant factor at 
sentencing if it could be "an underlying factor in the crime," such as "when the 
actions of the defendant are contrary to his or her history and character." 
Collins, 144 Idaho at 109, 162 P.3d at 788 (citations omitted). In such instances, 
a psychological evaluation "can assist the sentencing court in assessing the 
defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or 
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law .... " ~ (citing I.C. § 
19-2523(1 )(f)). 
The record here supports that Farr's criminal actions were perfectly 
consistent with his history and character. The victim, Gena, acknowledged that 
in the past, "when [Farr] became angry and accusatory, he was able to stop 
himself from becoming too physical, by either going into the garage to break 
things or by going on a walk," and "if it got too bad, she would take the kids and 
leave the house to give him time to calm down." (PSI, p. 5.) Further, information 
from Farr's sister supports that Farr has been violent and controlling in his 
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previous two relationships. (PSI, pp. 10-11.) Farr's sister expressed fear that 
Farr would try to hurt her and her family, as well as Gena and Gena's family. 
(PSI, pp. 10-11.) 
In his own interview with the presentence investigator before sentencing, 
Farr openly discussed feelings of inadequacy and insecurity, and that he drank 
alcohol excessively. (PSI, p. 20.) Farr "indicated that he has never considered 
or attempted suicide," but would welcome counseling to help understand himself. 
(PSI, p. 16.) At sentencing, Farr said, "I need some help and I really am sorry for 
hurting my wife. She's been through enough. I think it's time I just ... get help .. 
. . I look forward to getting to be with my wife again if she wants me; if she 
doesn't, I look forward to a relationship where we can at least have the kids 
between us and it not be bad." (2/17/12 Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 10, L. 7.) 
The presentence investigator reported that Farr appeared to be in need of 
intensive treatment to address mental health and substance abuse issues, and 
that Farr would benefit from a psychological evaluation. (PSI, pp. 16, 20.) 
However, under the Treatment Programs and/or Optional Recommendations 
section of the PSI, the investigator did not recommend a psychological 
evaluation to assist the court; she only recommended placement with the Idaho 
Department of Corrections, and a traditional retained jurisdiction program. (PSI, 
p. 21.) Ultimately, the information before the district court did not rule out that 
counseling would assist Farr in understanding his insecurities. But it also did not 
raise concerns about Farr's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. 
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In other words, the record does not reflect that the court needed a psychological 
evaluation to assess factors relevant to Farr's sentencing. 
In arguing that a psychological evaluation was necessary, Farr cites both 
Jockumsen and Collins. However, these cases are distinguishable on their facts. 
In Collins, the court found that significant evidence indicated the defendant's 
"criminal actions ... were part of a suicide effort," despite the district court's 
conclusion to the contrary. Collins, 144 Idaho at 410, 162 P.3d at 789. The 
Collins court noted that the district court "made decisions about [the defendant's] 
mental condition, the role it played in his crimes, and how that was to affect his 
sentence, without any formal psychological evaluation to assist in that 
determination." kl Concluding that the district court abused its discretion and 
manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32, the Collins court remanded for completion of 
an evaluation and resentencing. kl 
Similarly, in Jockumsen, the record supported that the defendant's mental 
condition was "plainly a significant factor for sentencing." Jockumsen, 148 idaho 
at 823, 229 P.3d at 1185. In that case, the defendant "had been found mentally 
incompetent to assist with his defense or to stand trial." kl In Jockumsen, as in 
Collins, the district court's comments showed that it considered the defendant's 
mental condition as an important factor at sentencing. kl Notably, the district 
court commented, "you are a risk to the community. What I'm having trouble 
getting my arms around is whether ... that's a result of your criminal thinking or . 
. . issues of mental illness or ... some combination of the two." kl The 
Jockumsen court concluded the district court lacked adequate information, and 
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remanded for resentencing, directing the district court to order a psychological 
evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522. !fL. 
Here, in contrast, the record does not support that Farr had any suicidal 
ideation. (See PSI, p. 16.) As Farr acknowledges, the district court made no 
mention of Farr's mental health at sentencing. (See 2/17/12 Tr., pp. 10-12; 
Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Instead, the district court imposed a term of eight years 
with three fixed "to rehabilitate [Farr] as well as protect the public." (2/17/12 Tr., 
p. 12, Ls. 2-5.) The district court also retained jurisdiction and recommended the 
therapeutic community with the warning, if Farr did not follow the rules, he would 
be sent "back with a relinquishment," and probably sent to do his prison term. 
(2/17/12 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 14-17.) 
The record shows no reason to believe Farr's mental health was a factor 
at sentencing. Collins, 144 Idaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. In light of the record 
before this Court, Farr has failed to show that the district court committed 
fundamental error in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32, in not ordering a 
psychological evaluation. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 820, 229 P.3d at 1182. 
11. 
Farr Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Farr argues that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction, citing Farr's - admittedly limited - success while on the retained 
jurisdiction program, Farr's recognition that he has a problem, and his 
9 
rehabilitative potential. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) The record supports the 
district court's exercise of sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction over a defendant and order 
execution of his sentence is within the sound discretion of the district court and 
will not be reversed absent a finding the court abused its discretion. State v. 
Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, _, 288 P.3d 132, 138 (Ct. App. 2012). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of 
discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. 
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). Here, 
the record fully supports the district court's determination that probation was 
inappropriate for Farr. 
When the district court accepted Farr's plea and released him on his own 
recognizance, it admonished Farr of the terms and conditions of such release, 
including the importance of heeding the no contact order. (12/21/11 Tr., p. 13, L. 
22 - p. 15, L. 21.) Despite the court's advice, Farr violated the no contact order. 
(PSI, p. 8.) When the district court ordered retained jurisdiction, it again 
cautioned Farr that "[t]his is your last chance to make a probation resolution in 
the case." (2/17/12 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 18-19.) But again, Farr violated the no contact 
order. (See 10/5/12 Tr., p. 40, Ls. 4-10.) 
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The district court described the facts of Farr's domestic battery conviction 
as "very alarming," "very troubling," and "chilling." (10/5/12 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 5-6; p. 
46, Ls. 14-15.) Farr's repeated violations of the no contact order - entered to 
protect the victim of his underlying crime - strike at the very nerve of that 
conviction. Farr's limited success in otherwise complying with treatment and 
programming do not diminish the real concern raised by Farr's refusal to abide 
by the no contact order. (See 10/5/12 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 18-21.) The facts 
establishing Farr's no contact order violations support the district court's exercise 
of discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction and executing sentence. 
111. 
Farr Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Farr contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 
35 motion to reduce his sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-19.) If a sentence is 
within applicable statutory limits, as here, a motion for reduction of sentence 
under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial of the 
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007). 
B. Standard Of Review 
On his appeal, Farr must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of 
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the Rule 35 motion." !fl Farr fails to satisfy his burden. 
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C. The Record Does Not Support That Denial Of Farr's Rule 35 Motion Was 
An Abuse Of Discretion 
As an initial matter, the new or additional information presented at hearing 
is limited to Farr's completion of "the MRT program and an anger management 
program." (2/8/13 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 17-19.) Accordingly, the other grounds raised on 
appeal must not be considered, including Farr's mental health condition, his 
alcohol problem, his lack of a prior felony record, and his expression of remorse. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-19.) Even if this Court considers those arguments, Farr 
fails to show an abuse of discretion. 
Notably, the challenged sentence is not particularly harsh, either with 
respect to the maximum allowed or as compared to the sentences reversed as 
unduly harsh in cases cited by Farr. The statutory maximum for Farr's crime is 
20 years. I.C. § 18-918(2), (4). The district court did not impose this maximum, 
despite finding that the underlying facts were "alarming," "troubling," and 
"chilling." (10/5/12 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 5-6; p. 46, Ls. 14-15.) Instead, it imposed 
eight years, with three years fixed. (R., pp. 66-67, 91-92.) In cases cited by 
Farr, the scrutinized sentences included consecutive maximum terms (State v. 
Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 962 P.2d 1054 (Ct. App. 1998)), and the death penalty 
(State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981)). Farr cites no authority 
on point, to support that the district court's sentencing decision here was 
excessive in light of his limited programming success. Instead, Farr relies on 
cases distinguishable by their facts. 
Farr first argues the district court failed to properly consider his mental 
health as a mitigating factor, citing Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581, 976 P.2d 
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927, 935 (1999). 2 (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-19.) The Hollon court cited I.C. § 19-
2523. 1st That provision requires a sentencing court to consider, among other 
factors, the risk of danger to the public, and defendant's ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct "if the defendant's mental condition is a significant 
factor." I.C. § 19-2523. The record here fails to support that Farr's mental 
condition was a significant factor in his crime, warranting leniency. At best, the 
record shows Farr struggles with insecurities that combine toxically with his 
alcohol abuse and anger management problems, resulting in, but not excusing, 
his criminal conduct. Farr has not met his burden of showing the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to properly consider his mental condition. 
Farr next argues the district court should have considered his alcohol 
problem as a mitigating factor, citing State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 
(Ct. App. 1982). (Appellant's brief, p. 16.) In Nice, the defendant was convicted 
of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor; the record showed the victim had 
initiated and pursued sexual contact with the defendant. lg. at 90, 645 P.2d at 
324. The Nice court held that the trial court failed to give proper consideration 
"to the part [defendant's alcohol problem] played in causing defendant to commit 
the crime," noting defendant had no prior history of sexual violations. 1st at 91, 
645 P.2d at 325. The record in Nice showed that the defendant's alcohol 
problem lowered his inhibitions to sexual advances by the victim. 1st In contrast, 
Farr's alcohol problem here contributed to a drunken rage in which he battered 
2 Ultimately, the Hollon court rejected the defendant's argument of excessive 
sentence given mental condition, for failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. 
Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581, 976 P.2d at 935. 
13 
his wife in front of his children. (PSI, pp. 3-4.) Given the factual differences, 
Nice does not support that the district court abused its discretion with respect to 
considerations of Farr's alcohol problem. 
Farr also cites State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981), 
arguing that his alcohol abuse should have been a mitigating factor at 
sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p. 16.) In Osborn, the court addressed the need 
to weigh mitigating factors against aggravating circumstances in determining 
whether imposition of the death penalty is unduly harsh. ~ at 414, 631 P.2d at 
196. The court noted that written findings of sentencing considerations, required 
under I.C. § 19-2515 for capital cases, serves to help "assure that the imposition 
of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required." 
~ at 414-15, 631 P.2d at 196-97. Because Farr's is not a capital case, Osborn 
is also distinguishable. 
Farr further contends the district court failed to consider that he had no 
prior felony convictions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15, 17 (citing PSI, pp. 3, 5-6).) In 
support, Farr cites Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 962 P.2d 1054. As already noted, 
the court in Hoskins, cited by Farr, concluded that an order imposed on a first-
time felony offender, to serve consecutive maximum sentences, was unduly 
harsh. ~ at 673, 962 P.2d at 1057. Farr's singular sentence, not at the 
maximum, is distinguishable from the defendant's sentences in Hoskins. See 
I.C. 18-918(2)(b). Although the defendant's first-time felony status was cited by 
the Nice court as a mitigating factor, it was one factor among many, as already 
discussed herein. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90-91, 645 P.2d at 324-25. Thus Farr has 
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failed to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly 
consider his lack of a prior felony record. 
Finally, Farr argues the district court failed to properly consider Farr's 
expressions of remorse, citing State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 651 P.2d 527 
(1982). (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-19.) In Shideler, the court concluded "that the 
defendant's character and the circumstances surrounding the case . . . 
outweigh[ed] the gravity of the crime and the protection of the public interest," 
warranting reduction of the sentence "in the furtherance of justice" from 20 years 
indeterminate to 12. kl 595, 651 P.2d at 529. The holding in Shideler does not 
require an automatic sentence reduction whenever a defendant expresses 
remorse. Rather it emphasizes the need to weigh the circumstances against the 
seriousness of the crime and the public interest, and reduce a sentence where 
such reduction is needed to further justice. 
In this case, although terse, the district court stated, "Mr. Farr, the Court 
has considered your Rule 35 motion. I went a long ways towards having a 
contested extended hearing on why you ... should be relinquished. I've 
considered the sentence. I've reconsidered the PSI today, both your version and 
the victim's version of what happened." (2/8/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 8-13.) Again 
highlighting the seriousness of Farr's domestic battery against his wife, the 
district court noted that its concerns were reflected in the sentence, and 
concluded, "It is discretionary with the Court whether to grant you some sort of 
relief ... I am going to deny the motion today." (2/8/13 Tr.,p. 12, Ls. 14-18.) 
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Given the facts of this case and the district court's comments, Farr has not 
shown the court abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction and denial of the Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2013. 
D~G 1¥ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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